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Introduction: A Risk Society?
The state of uncertainty -of not knowing, and therefore being unable to control, the unfolding of the future and the state of the world -has preoccupied humanity for centuries. And, as Luhmann (1993) points out, the manner in which this state is explained is crucial for understanding how societies operate and organize themselves, and indeed, for revealing within those explanations the nature of entire worldviews. In the modern world, such concerns tend to be increasingly couched in terms of 'risk', a concept which is both historically specific and grounded in a particular temporal orientation. It is the purpose of this article to examine the www.sagepublications.com development of this concept, tracing its construction out of the interaction of grand temporal narratives with wider socio-economic relations. It starts by noting how medieval narratives of temporality explained away uncertainty as part of a cosmology in which the future was relatively determined and 'closed' to human intervention. It goes on to examine the erosion of this hierarchical system and the gradual 'colonization of the future' that was brought about by the advent of a system of global capitalism. Such socio-economic upheaval engendered new notions of temporality and human agency, expressed in the optimistic Enlightenment belief in the possibility of eliminating the uncertainties of the future through rational action in the present. This notion of the future as something open and amenable to transformation cleared a space for the emergence of the concept of risk as a means of calculating -and so controlling -the uncertainties of that future; a concept which gained increasing influence throughout the development of the modern period. More recently, its ability to quantify the contingencies of the future, and so provide a guide for action in the present, has given the concept or risk a central explanatory role in the indeterminate world of late modernity, and it is at this point that this article begins its analysis.
In the last 20 years or so, the notion of risk has become extremely popular in social science, influencing research in many areas of social inquiry, from social policy and theory to international relations and political science. Its effect is particularly marked in sociology, where, since the late 1980s a distinctive 'sociology of risk' has emerged. Lupton (1999a) has grouped this into three broad perspectives -the cultural-constructivist approach exemplified by Douglas (1986; , the governmentality perspective influenced by Foucault and provided by writers such as Castel (1991) , Ewald (1991) , O'Malley (1996; and Dean (1999a, b) , and lastly, perhaps the most influential perspective -the 'risk society' model advanced by Beck (1992) and also Giddens (1991) . In all of these, the notion of risk is crucial in different ways: As a social construct, as a calculative discourse, and finally, as an integral feature of late modern societies. On a more subjective level, the recognition that we live in insecure times has given us a reflexive awareness of the risks we face in everyday life -through our consumption habits (Bauman, 1988; Ward, 1994) , our leisure (Lyng, 1990; Parker, Aldridge and Measham, 1998) , our work practices (Nelkin and Brown, 1984) and our attitudes to our bodies and our health (Gabe, 1995) .
To paraphrase Beck (1992) , at the beginning of the new millennium, it sometimes appears that we are living not so much in a risk society, as in a society saturated in risk discourse.
The reification of risk
However, this enthusiastic deployment that draws 'risk' into ever grander and more diverse theoretical and empirical fields frequently tends to overlook the limitations of the concept itself, disregarding its constructed, temporal nature and treating it as though it referred to some 'real' state of the world.
Running though much of the literature is an implicit acceptance of 'risk' as a real or quasi-real phenomenon, and an assumption that it exists as something that can be 'experienced', 'produced' or 'measured' as if it were an a priori reality. Such usage reifies potential danger as if it were a property of things (Levidow, 1994) . This orientation may partly stem from the origins of the concept in the physical sciences, but, more recently, is surely at least encouraged by Beck's (1992) influential neo-realist depiction of 'risk' as an objective feature of post-industrial society. Although he does admit that risk is 'open to social definition and construction' (p. 23), implicit throughout his analysis is a realist assumption of a 'risk society' as a global phenomenon within processes of modernization, and an increased incidence of actual risk in the world. In this nomenclature, risks are 'goods to be avoided' (p. 34). Furthermore, they are incalculable, and it is this move to incalculablity that lies behind the transformation of society. The growth of technology generates risks whose effects are unlimited in time and space, with the potential to affect unborn generations across the globe; a feature that renders the legal and scientific calculation of risk obsolete (p. 22). As a result of this incalculability, modern 'risks' cannot be contained, anticipated or protected against, and a whole new social order comes into being around them.
The postulation of 'risk' as something that is both real and yet incalculable is based on a misapplication of the concept of risk itself. It is argued here that 'risk' is not real, but rather that it is a measure of calculation: A means of quantifying that reality. Both these strands of argument are developed throughout the remainder of this article, but before we turn to them, it is useful to briefly address some of the issues surrounding the status -'real' or otherwise -of this notion of risk.
Firstly, it can be stated that the fundamental reflexivity of the social world means that 'risk' cannot exist as an objective phenomenon. There are no risks 'out there', as many commentators from broadly constructionist and governmental positions have pointed out (Adam, 1990; Ewald, 1991; Luhmann, 1993; Adams, 1995; Dean, 1999a) . The world does not exist 'objective' and independent of human consciousness. By being in the world, we affect it, and by knowing it, we respond to it in ways that change it. Similarly with the case of risk, our perception of what might constitute a risk affects how we act, which in turn alters the nature of the 'objective' world in which the 'risk' is situated. So, as long as human actors who perceive and think and respond are involved in the probability equation, there can be no such thing as 'objective' risk. As Luhmann (1993) puts it: 'The outside world itself knows no risks, for it knows neither distinctions, nor expectations, nor evaluations, nor probabilities' (p. 6). There is no such thing as risk in the world, only dangers we construct in our head.
Furthermore, we cannot 'experience' risk, since the concept itself is essentially a temporal one, grounded in its relation to an unknown future. It is defined by and through temporality: The notion of 'risk' expresses not something that has happened or is happening, but something that might happen. Although its meanings have changed since its emergence in the seventeenth century, and although it is used in a variety of ways to describe different social situations today, the concept of risk can still be defined largely through its attempt to calculate and so manage the uncertainties of the future. It is an expression of the likelihood of some situation or event -usually negative -occurring, and so, when we are talking about risks, we are talking about the future: Trying to work out what will happen next, and what we can do to avoid or expedite it. In this sense, it cannot be experienced directly -by definition, risk is the calculation of uncertainty in the future, and once something previously defined as a risk has occurred, it can no longer be a risk, but becomes a past event, an occurrence, a fact. Risk vanishes as soon as the anticipated event occurs. Strictly speaking, we should not really write of 'lived' risk or the 'experience' of risk at all, but only of 'risk calculation', since in Kantian terms, risk is fundamentally an epistemological category -it exists as a feature of knowing; not an aspect of being.
Having outlined these basic limitations, the remainder of this article seeks to show that the concept of risk is a means of dealing with uncertainty that rests on a particular temporal orientation. By tracing its historical development through certain key periods, it highlights how the emergence and evolution of the concept exists in dynamic interdependence with notions of temporality and uncertainty, that in turn are embedded in wider social, economic and epistemological formations.
'Sublime Recapitulation': Medieval Narratives of Temporality
There were no risks in pre-industrial societies. In cultures where technological control over the natural world was limited, the uncertainties of everyday life were expressed and managed through a range of religious and magical beliefs in concepts such as fate, providence and luck.
During the medieval period, such beliefs were part of a cosmology in which every earthly event and the fate of every individual was depicted as a symbolic representation of the will of God (Gurvitch, 1964) . The doctrine of divine providence stipulated that everything happened for a purpose and so every event, however insignificant, was a predetermined part of a grand design, clues 386 TIME & SOCIETY 13(2/3) to which were to be found in apparently random or 'chance' events (Hacking, 1975) . Even time was subject to meaning in such worldviews. Since the categories of space and time were created by God, both were imbued with religious meaning, and were interdependent. They came together in the individual's position in the 'great chain of being' (Lovejoy, 1960) -the rigid social hierarchy that determined one's place in the world, as well as the unfolding of their destiny. Since the material world was regarded as a microcosm of a higher one, such a position was a literal, as well as a symbolic, depiction of the order of the universe. Such a position -established by God, continued by heredity, and backed by tradition -assured individuals of their place, their function and their role in the world, and was utterly inflexible. In this determined structure, 'time' was not a measure of earthly duration, but a symbolic representation of transcendental meaning, and as such was regarded as heterogeneous in nature, with different times possessing different values or properties (Gurvitch, 1964; Le Goff, 1980) . Furthermore, it was assumed to unfold in a regular and predictable manner as it had done in the past, following the course set out by God in the ideal of what Umberto Eco (1995) called 'sublime recapitulation'.
However, even within such a relatively closed system, an alternative set of beliefs in magic and luck existed that allowed for the exercise of at least some degree of human intervention in matters of contingency.
1 Medieval life was surrounded by rituals that attempted to foresee and influence the future, with, for example, divination utilized to forecast the weather and determine the most propitious times to harvest, charms and blessings used to encourage health and prosperity and ward off misfortune, and the notion of lucky times invoked to explain the vicissitudes of everyday life, and to decide a future course of action (Thomas, 1997) .
Such a cosmology embodied a conception of time as a meaningful, symbolic entity that explained the apparent uncertainties of the future with reference to motive forces, whether providential designs or magical influences.
2 At the same time, however, within such an orientation, it was virtually impossible to conceive of the concept of randomness, far less ideas such as 'risk', for it did not allow for the conception of a world in which things happened for no reason, nor, crucially, for one in which the future was shaped by human, rather than transcendental, intervention.
The 'Colonization of the Future': The Emergence of Risk
From around the seventeenth century, dramatic developments in social, intellectual and economic life transformed ideas about uncertainty, the future and human agency, modifying the determinism of the Middle Ages and laying the REITH: UNCERTAIN TIMES 387 groundwork for the creation of the notion of 'risk'. These momentous changes have been well documented elsewhere (Braudel, 1973; Holton, 1985; Freudenthal, 1986) . Here, the focus is confined to specific aspects that paved the way for the emergence of the notion of risk and, in Hagerstrand's (1985) words, allowed for the 'colonization of the future'.
In economics, the growth of a system of mercantile capitalism, speculation, insurance and credit in an international marketplace undermined the traditional social hierarchy of the Middle Ages. This move has been described as a 'temporalizing of the great chain of being' (Lovejoy, 1960) , and the agents of change were the dynamic new merchant class, whose trade-related concerns encouraged a more active engagement with the uncertainties of the future. The idea that fate or providence would oversee the unfolding of events could no longer provide sufficient assurance to those whose goods might be at stake in trading situations. The creation of profits depended on foresight and planning, which in turn demanded consideration of a future that was neither fixed nor beyond human control (Ewald, 1991) . Now 'God's time' became 'merchants' time' 3 (Le Goff, 1980) : A commodity to be used, saved or sold to create profits, rather than something that was simply doled out by the creator. Concern with issues such as rates of profit, interest and wages rationalized the heterogeneous time of the Middle Ages, and encouraged the conception of it as something homogenous and universal instead. Its new location in the abstract institutions of commerce finally liberated it from the symbolic representation of higher meaning, and separated it from its interdependence with place (Weber, 1904 (Weber, /1989 Harvey, 1989) .
This new conception of temporality dovetailed with the emergent traderelated focus on the future, and laid the groundwork for a way of reasoning about uncertainty that was based on long-term predictions and large-scale spatial units. This was articulated in the new mathematical fields of probability and statistics, in whose abstract, formal theorems the preoccupations of the era were reflected. This area of study, which Pascal (1656 Pascal ( /1987 called 'the geometry of hazard', was based on a radical reorientation to the future. Up until then, the focus had been on individual, unconnected events in the present that were seen as signs of providential meaning. Now, attention shifted from the short term to the long term and from the individual case to the general rule. It was a case of casting the analytical net over a wide expanse: Over time and across space to capture large groups of events or individuals over the long term, and of expanding the time frame to a 'size which smoothed out local perturbations into an overall uniformity' (Daston, 1988: 115) . 4 This approach demonstrated that, although singular events might appear random and unpredictable in the short term, over an extended period, they invariably fell into regular and predictable patterns. In other words, by gathering enough information over a sufficiently long period of time, informed estimates about the unfolding of the future could be made.
Although they transformed thinking about the future, the predictive capacity of probability and statistics was marred by one theoretical flaw, for although they were able to make generalizations about groups over time, they were unable to deal with small units in the present. The aggregate was greater than the sum of its parts, but it was not reducible to them, and so although probability could estimate, for example, the odds of red coming up at roulette at 50:50, it could never predict what the specific outcome of the next round would be (Reith, 1999a) .
Still, the significance of these theorems lay elsewhere, for within their formulae lay a reconceptualization of the future that was expressed in the new concept of 'risk'.
5 From the Anglo-French risqué, the term was first used in the midseventeenth century, and brought time and uncertainty into a quantifiable relation: Quite simply, the risk of an event occurring was the probability of it happening over a stated period of time. The practice of insurance as a means of guarding against uncertainty developed almost simultaneously, and was an attempt to protect the individual from the threat of these newly predictable events (Hacking, 1975; Ewald, 1991) . 6 The notions of risk and insurance embodied a calculative, long-term approach to uncertainty that signalled a radical new way of thinking about temporality. Probability's emphasis on the importance of the long term for making predictions was indicative of a worldview in which the uncertainties of the future were no longer regarded as acts of Divine intention, but rather as events to be understood through the concept of risk and managed through the practice of insurance. The notion of risk itself embodied this new conception of an open future, signifying not something that will happen, but something that might happen. Together, these provided a formal guide for behaviour based on the premise of rational action in the present in order to ameliorate the uncertainty of the future. In the concept of risk, then, we can see the articulation of a new worldview, released from the strictures of tradition, in which the world is opened up to the influence of human agency. For the first time, individuals were free to determine their own trajectory and to shape their own destiny, in the expansive move, described eloquently by Alexander Koyré (1982) , from 'the closed world to the infinite universe'.
Ironically, however, although the calculation of risk made a space for the exercise of human will, it was in fact a limited form of agency, for the very predictive power of probability and statistics themselves was founded on the basis of a strict determinism. This was part of the Enlightenment's scientific epistemé, based on a Newtonian model of the universe as a machine bound by fixed relations of cause and effect. In it, events in the future were regarded as being caused by occurrences in the past, from which they proceeded in a straightforward linear progression. Probability theory was able to quantify potential risks because, in a world governed by causal relations, sufficient REITH: UNCERTAIN TIMES 389 knowledge of relevant factors made the uncertainties of the future estimable. Moreover, such analysis -like all scientific endeavour -was regarded as part of the progressive advancement of knowledge which would uncover the 'truths' of the natural world and allow for ever-greater accuracy in prediction and, ultimately, control of an increasingly certain future. The determinism that underlined this orientation was supported by the concepts of absolute space and time as entities in their own right: As categories that were homogenous, objective and everywhere true. In Newton's words: 'Absolute, true and mathematical time, of itself and from its own nature, flows equably, without regard for anything external' (in Koyré, 1982: 161) . In other words, the laws that bound time, space and matter were fixed and immutable. Furthermore, they were also essentially meaningful, for although it was generally agreed that mechanical forces governed the universe, crucially, these were overseen by the prime mover, and as such, were an expression of providential, rather than secular, order (Hacking, 1975) .
However, this would change. Even as it was being 'colonized' by human agency, the future was already coming under threat from technological and scientific developments that would undermine the basis of determinism and ultimately oversee the disappearance of the 'open' future of the early modern period.
The Loss of the Future: Indeterminism
The consolidation and advancement of increasingly sophisticated forms of capitalist production between the nineteenth and twenty-first centuries transformed notions of temporality, determinism and causation, and created new applications for the concept of risk. In particular, the development of scientific and technological innovations such as the telephone, wireless and aeroplane, shrunk and accelerated the world, overcoming physical distance as they created systems of communication between individuals and events around the globe. These effectively undermined absolutist perceptions of time and space in a period of what Harvey (1989) terms 'space-time compression'. At the same time, the French Revolution, widespread industrial unrest and political agitation shattered the Enlightenment ideal of the existence of universal standards of human rationality, while widespread certainties were eroded and long-held beliefs in the existence of God shaken, giving rise to the 'ontological insecurity' of the age (de Jong, 1975) .
These changes -most notably, secularization and the undermining of absolutism -destroyed the basis of the providential determinism of previous centuries, and led to a growing awareness, throughout the physical and social sciences, that the world was not, in fact, deterministic (Hacking, 1975; 1990). 7 This transformation was reflected most noticeably in physics, where indeter-390 TIME & SOCIETY 13(2/3) minism demolished the mechanistic, Newtonian model of the universe, replacing the certainty and predictability of solid matter and causal laws with uncertainties and probabilities -the building blocks of quantum reality (Zohar and Marshall, 1993) . The work of Albert Einstein showed that time was relative and contextual: Dependent on observers and their frames of measurement, rather than absolute and quantifiable. Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle proved the impossibility of measuring both position and momentum simultaneously, showing that time and space were not constant and measurable, but could only, at best, ever be probable (Gigerenzer et al., 1989) . While Niels Bohr demonstrated how electrons jumped from one state to another in unpredictable and discontinuous 'leaps', Brownian motion was revealed as an example of pure a-causal movement. Far from being guided by the hand of God or by regular scientific laws, the new science portrayed activity that was simply random; that followed no obvious pattern, and revealed no hidden meaning. The undermining of determimism had dramatic implications for temporality. While Newtonian physics rested on the assumption of logical relations between events that are separate in time, the world of quantum reality postulated the principles of simultaneity, instantaneity, and relativity, so halting the predictable march of linear time and undermining the basis of causation. In its place came a reality based on 'non-local connections and a-causal events; an indivisible, dynamic, patterned whole that resisted abstraction or sequencing' (Adam, 1990: 57-8) . It was now stochiastic processes, not causal laws, that were regarded as the foundation of the natural world -and, gradually, extended to the social world too.
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During the period known variously as 'late', 'high', 'post' or 'reflexive' modernity (Giddens, 1991; Bauman, 1992; Beck, 1992; Baudrillard, 1998) , the technological innovations that were so crucial in the development of modernity were intensified and reached an apogee in the creation of what has been described as a global present in which the future is virtually un-knowable (Adam, 1990; Giddens, 1991) . In these 'disorganized' capitalist economies (Lash and Urry, 1994) , the pace of life is accelerated, and its direction is increasingly unpredictable. Globally connected financial markets and advanced digital networks create instant communication, so that events and decisions can be transmitted around the world in nanoseconds. Technologies such as interactive television, mobile phones and the internet transform relations between individuals, overcoming separation in space and time by what Giddens (1990) describes as the processes of 'disembedding' -the removal of events from their local time frame, and 'time-space distantiation': The reorganization of time and space in a way that 'connect[s] presence and absence' (p. 14). Such instantaneity renders causal relations meaningless since, as became apparent in the early twentieth century, events must be separate from their causes in time to allow for the establishment of a predictable relationship. The speed of the modern world REITH: UNCERTAIN TIMES 391 distorts such straightforward relations however, giving us 'the triumph of effect over cause, of instantaneity over time' (Baudrillard, 1988) .
All of this works to effectively eliminate the future, replacing it instead with an endlessly extended present. As the distance between the 'now' and the future disappears, the latter ceases to have any forward projection, and collapses in on itself. Such a movement is described by Nowotny (1985) , who writes that 'the category of the future is shrinking towards becoming a mere extension of the present because science and technology have successfully reduced the distance that is needed to accommodate their own products' (p. 15). Contemporary technology not only collapses the future into the present but also creates systems of such profound complexity that the prediction of future events is virtually impossible. These systems, known as 'chaotic', describe how a minor occurrence in one part of the world, whether, for example in financial markets or ecological systems, can multiply exponentially and create major, unpredictable events in another.
These kinds of simultaneity and non-linearity in physical, economic and social systems make prediction all but impossible; a state of affairs that has a significant impact on human action. While determinism allowed for the planning of the future based on knowledge of the past, in an indeterministic world, such prediction is impossible. With the undermining of the assumption that the future will follow the past, and with the very notion of the future itself becoming increasingly tenuous as it collapses into an extended present, the basis for planning, expectation and the forward movement of the self becomes difficult to sustain. As Bauman (1992) puts it, the postmodern condition 'is both undetermined and undetermining. It "unbinds" time; weakens the constraining impact of the past and effectively prevents colonization of the future ' (p. 190, emphasis in original) . It has long been recognized that such a forward movement is crucial for human existence, and that the self is defined and maintained through its dynamic projection into the future (Bergson, 1911 (Bergson, /1991 Minkowski, 1970). 9 Indeed, it has been shown that when this sense of forward movement into the future breaks down, for example through sickness (Charmaz, 1992) , depression (Ellenberger, 1958) , addiction (Reith, 1999b) or imprisonment (Brown, 1998), then certain distortions or 'pathologies' of the self can arise. Such issues are especially pressing in an age in which the future is more than ever the site of identity formation for the rational self-determining individual. Given that the 'reflexive project of the self' (Giddens, 1991) is an ongoing process of calculation that involves the individual moving forwards into the future, radical uncertainty about the nature of that future undermines the very nature of being, and gives rise to a state of heightened ontological insecurity. Such a problem is especially acute in the modern world where, to a greater extent than ever before, the structural conditions of late capitalism force the individual to confront the world alone. Traditional social institutions and practices, such as the family, 392 TIME & SOCIETY 13(2/3) work and religion, that once provided security and stability are becoming increasingly fluid, leaving the individual without solid footing in economic and social life (Bauman, 1988; Giddens, 1991) . The profound uncertainty generated within a globalized, indeterministic world erodes the basis for decision making, freezes action, and ultimately blocks the possibility of forward movement into the future. Indeed, the future no longer exists as something that is open to 'colonization' by confident, rational action, but rather as a site of anxiety, full of unknowns, that is not amenable to human intervention. This creates a quandary, for although the future may be radically contingent and unknowable, the individual must still engage with it. The problem that now faces them is -how to act.
Back to the Future: The Utility of 'Risk'
It is here that the notion of risk has efficacy.
Given that the calculation of risk had originally been based on the assumption that the future was, to an extent, predictable, the state of indeterminism might be expected to render it obsolete as a form of knowledge. Far from it. If anything, its field of application expanded even further within an indeterminate universe as the notion of risk moved progressively through the social sciences, explaining uncertainty in a variety of disciplines.
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The postulation of indeterminism did not abolish the utility of risk calculation, for the latter was simply adapted to suit its modified subject. We have seen that the essence of risk assessment is the attempt, through the calculus of probability and statistics, to quantify and predict the future. By gathering relevant information over a sufficiently long period, an informed estimate regarding the unfolding of future occurrences can be made. However, these are never specific predictions about exact events, but only generalizations about likely ones. This was what was undertaken in the formulae of probability and statistics in the seventeenth century, when the world was thought to be predictable and absolute knowledge was thought to be possible. Even then, the project was not always successful, for, quite simply, the world was not always predictable, and perfect knowledge remained an ideal. Today, in the twenty-first century, the focus of probability and statistics is still long-term regularities, albeit within a world now deemed indeterminate. However, given that the type of knowledge produced by statistics and probability has only ever been -and can only ever be -generalized likelihoods, their 'predictive' power -always vague -is hardly compromised. Instead, only their claims to authority need be scaled back, and this is what has happened. Rather than aiming for certainty, around the mid-twentieth century the calculation of risk began to reflect the uncertainties of an indeterminate world instead.
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At this point, statistics began to be used to represent fluctuations and probabilities, rather than to measure and quantify certainties. In other words, they were starting to show that knowledge was imperfect, uncertain and limited. This shift influenced the disciplines that used statistical techniques, and it was in economics that the concept of risk first expanded to provide a new form of knowledge based on uncertainty. Here, the ideal of perfect knowledge and prediction was replaced with partial knowledge and risk minimization. Writers such as Knight (1921 ), von Mises (1949 and von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) constructed a model that moved away from the ideal of perfect knowledge in certain conditions, and replaced it with one based on partial knowledge and risk minimization. Since absolute certainty of future events was impossible, the best course of action was simply risk minimization, and this could be achieved by the rational calculation of relevant factors. In such models, the notion of risk represents an order of knowledge that has given up all hope of certainty, instead concerning itself with calculating degrees of probability and belief; hence Knight's (1921) classic description of it as 'determinate uncertainty ' (p. 46) . Contrary to the optimistic Enlightenment belief that greater knowledge brings greater certainty, this application of risk makes clear that the more knowledge we have, the less certain we become, and the ideal of certainty is replaced with an ongoing exercise in probability calculation. As Luhmann (1993) puts it, this is a form of knowledge in which 'nothing certain can be discerned . . . only what is more or less probable or improbable ' (p. ix) It can be seen then, that the postulation of indeterminism does not in itself undermine the utility of risk calculation as a means of dealing with the future. Following on from this, the distinction between 'calculable' and 'incalculable' risk can be seen to be wrong. When, for example, Beck (1992) argues that certain dangers, such as nuclear and chemical hazards, abolish the calculus of risk because they are too vast to be estimated, he is mistaking their uninsurability (which is undoubtedly the case, and a feature of insurer's policies) with such supposed incalculability (p. 102).
11 In fact, there is nothing that cannot be assessed by risk analysis, since, by definition, the latter is based on the calculus of a variety of uncertain contingencies. The concept of risk is tailor-made for situations of indeterminacy, for there can be no such thing as an 'incalculable' risk. Whether it calculates these contingencies accurately is, of course, another matter entirely. However, the point being made here is that the utility of the notion of 'risk' lies not in its ability to correctly predict future outcomes (at which, on the level of the individual, it is not particularly successful), but rather in its ability to provide a basis for decision making, 394 TIME & SOCIETY 13(2/3)
The utility of risk
The utility of such a role, in terms of the problem of human action, can perhaps be better seen through an examination of what O'Malley (1996; and Dean (1999a) describe as 'prudentialism' -an aspect of neo-liberal government based on the premise of rational individuals taking responsibility for their own welfare through the calculation of risk. Here, citizens have a duty to safeguard themselves against what are perceived to be risks by keeping themselves informed about potential dangers, weighing up probabilities and likelihoods, evaluating courses of action and ultimately, protecting themselves against harm (O'Malley, 1996; Dean, 1999a, b; Rose, 1999) . Myriad practices and consumer products exist to make the management of these so-called risks a part of everyday life, from the fitness regimes, low-fat diets and private insurance that safeguard against ill-health and old age; to the burglar alarms, security devices and informed suspicion of dangerous areas and persons that protect against crime. Added to this, a plethora of official publications and specialist and lay organizations advise the individual on how to avoid, manage or cope with the contingencies of everyday life, from the British Medical Association's guide to Living With Risk (1987) , to the formation of community groups such as Neighbourhood Watch. Such responses indicate that, despite the tendency for it to be individualized, the concept of risk may also act as a stimulus for the emergence of new social formations that coalesce around the shared rituals of calculation and avoidance (Dean, 1999b) . Although the focus of the discourse on prudentialism is on the technology of risk as a means of bio-power and control, the approach as a whole can be argued to have wider implications, and can illuminate the broad, pragmatic role of risk calculation as a guide for individual behaviour.
In this sense, the utility of the concept of risk derives from its essentially forward-looking orientation, and, from this, its ability to express uncertainty in calculable form. By taking a set of known factors in the present, the calculation of risk involves the expansion of the time frame and the projection into the future until the appearance of regularities and patterns create a sense of predictability. It takes the lone individual and socializes them, by placing them in groups of their own kind; and it takes the collapsed present of late modernity and expands it into the future.
Such a strategy does not, of course, make the future any more certain, and the individual's movement into it is still a journey into new territory -what Giddens (1991) calls the realm of 'counterfactual possibility' (p. 111). However, in many ways the calculation of risk does something more important, for the active weighing up of the future in order to minimize loss and maximize gain provides individuals with a guide for rational action and confers a degree of control over uncertainty (Douglas, 1992) . They may not know what the future holds, but by following expert advice, they know that they are 'doing the right thing': Armed with the appropriate information, individuals can feel secure as they go about their business, knowing that they are taking active steps to protect their wellbeing and shape their future. It may be impossible to know 'what will happen', but at least if things do go wrong, they have the comfort of knowing that they acted 'correctly' in ways that are consonant with agreed principles of risk management. As Luhmann (1998) put it: 'If the impossible happens, one can defend oneself with the argument that one decided correctly, namely in risk-rational manner ' (p. 72) . In this way, risk calculation works to 'immunize decision-making against failure' (Luhmann, 1993: 13) . 12 The calculation of risk cannot guarantee the avoidance of ill-results, and it cannot provide assurances about an uncertain future. But its role transcends this: Independently of success or failure, it provides a justifiable guide for behaviour. Although it cannot make the future predictable or the world certain, it can create the means for acting as though it were.
Knowledge of the world in terms of risk embodies a particular view of the future: It 'brings the future into a calculative relation to the present' (Levitas, 2000: 201) . It also embodies a particular view of the individual as an agent moving forwards into it; towards a specific vision of the self. In the seventeenth century, the concept of risk captured the sense of the future as something that was opening up, breaking free from the strictures of traditional society. Today, the particular calculative and temporal orientations that are involved in the calculation of risk are useful in a different way: Not as a reflection of an open future, but as an image of such a thing. Since the identification of something as 'a risk' refers to some knowledge -however partial -of future danger, its threat is located within the boundaries of human action. The temporal orientation involved in the calculation of risk brings the uncertain future into the domain of individual agency in the present, so creating the possibility of self-realization and control. Moreover, such a projection acts as a stimulus to the individual, whose forwards movement is animated by the awareness and negotiation of risks. This way of thinking and acting reanimates the 'blocked' future, allowing individuals to form their own trajectories, and can be seen as a 'means of seeking to stabilize outcomes, a mode of colonising the future' (Giddens, 1991: 133) . In the world of late modernity, where the future has collapsed into a globalized, indeterminate present, the ongoing calculation of risk becomes a formal strategy for moving into the future, so that, as Luhmann (1998) puts it, today 'modern society experiences its future in the form of the risk of deciding' (pp. 70-1).
396 TIME & SOCIETY 13(2/3) repayment depended on the safe completion of a voyage -had existed since the fourth millennium BC. In the seventeenth century, however, a more sophisticated form emerged that calculated the chances of a ship coming home against the chances of its being lost at sea, and in doing so, for the first time took account of the probability of marine losses and gains (Daston, 1988) . 7. See Hacking (1990) on this process, related to what he calls 'the taming of chance' as secularization undermined basis of determinism. 8. Although the insights of quantum physics are far removed from the macro reality of the social world, discoveries in science both influence and are influenced by 'ways of seeing' the broader world around us (Kuhn, 1970) , and it is in this sense that the new temporal and epistemological structures suggested by the quantum revolution are significant. 9. As well, of course, as a recognition of its location in the past, expressed through the continuities of memory and tradition. 10. All of these have their own different perspectives, with their own areas of study and their own distinct set of epistemological assumptions. The concern here is not with the particular arguments and discourses that have sprung up around the concept of risk, as these are numerous and have been dealt with extensively elsewhere . See for example Adam, Beck and van Loon (2000) , Caplan (2000) and Lupton (1999a, b) . Rather, what is important here is simply the existence and extent of a widespread discourse on risk within the social sciences itself. The concern is with how it is possible that these perspectives have become meaningful -and popular -at all. 11. See Dean (1999b) on the confusion of the identification of 'risk' in general with the specific case of insurer's risks. 12. Luhmann (1993) also points out that the form of risk rationality 'serves to generate a paradox, namely the demonstration that a wrong decision is right' (p. 24).
